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Abstract—The possibility of fingerprinting the search key-
words issued by a user on popular web search engines is a
significant threat to user privacy. This threat has received surpris-
ingly little attention in the network traffic analysis literature. In
this work, we consider the problem of keyword fingerprinting of
HTTPS traffic—we study the impact of several factors, including
client platform diversity, choice of search engine, feature sets
as well as classification frameworks. We conduct both closed-
world and open-world evaluations using nearly 4 million search
queries collected over a period of three months. Our analysis
reveals several insights into the threat of keyword fingerprinting
in modern HTTPS traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Search engines are among the most popular websites
worldwide [5]. In fact, a significant fraction of referrals to even
other popular websites (for instance, 55.3% of referrals to the
fifth most popular website, wikipedia.org), come from search
engines [56]. Indeed, search query keywords are invaluable
for improving user search results, preventing click fraud, re-
ducing irrelevant advertising, and even detecting the spread of
epidemics like influenza [25]. However, the same keywords—
if leaked—may also reveal quite sensitive information about
the user, including health issues, marital problems, abuse, and
controversial political stance [8]. Hence, the possibility of
fingerprinting search queries, from the network traffic they
generate, is a significant privacy concern.
Over the past decade, the traffic analysis literature has de-
voted significant attention to the topic of website and webpage
fingerprinting—in which network traffic headers are used to
fingerprint which website, or webpage within a website, a user
visited [31], [52], [39], [45], [51], [30], [1], [57], [81], [3].
However, this large body of work has mostly ignored the more
challenging problem of fingerprinting search queries issued by
a user—in which instead of simply discovering that a user
is visiting the search engine google.com, traffic analysis is
used to fingerprint the actual keywords (such as pregnancy
or depression) that she may be searching for.1
The notable recent exception is [48], which studies key-
word fingerprinting in the context of the Tor anonymization
network—and shows that the presence of one among 300
targeted keywords can be flagged with 80% recall and 91%
precision, and the specific keyword can be identified with up
to 48% accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, however, there
is no prior work that helps us understand how fingerprintable
are search keywords in modern HTTPS traffic, which is the
dominant transfer scenario used by the vast majority of Internet
users [27]. It is important to note that keyword fingerprinting
1Note that keyword fingerprinting is much more challenging than webpage
fingerprinting, since the search results returned by a search engine for a given
keyword can change within short time spans. Furthermore, compared to pages
within most websites, the number of search result pages generated by a search
engine is enormous, with most sharing the format of results returned, while
often sharing content across different search terms—in short, it is more difficult
to distinguish between search pages and fingerprint keywords reliably.
of HTTPS traffic is quite different from that of Tor traffic, due
to differences in structural information revealed in the traffic.
In this paper, we focus on HTTPS traffic and explore the
limits of fingerprinting search keywords at Internet scale, by
considering the impact of several influencing factors. We ask:
1) How accurately can one of a targeted set of search queries
be identified, when a user relies on prominent web search
engines?
2) Does the use of some search engines make a user more
vulnerable to privacy violations/attacks?
3) How does diversity in client browser platforms impact
the accuracy of fingerprinting search queries? Do some
browsers make a user more vulnerable to privacy attacks?
4) What type of traffic features aid in keyword fingerprinting?
What type of noise is an impediment?
5) Given the volatility of search results, how often must a
classifier be re-trained for keyword fingerprinting?
6) Finally, how fingerprint-able are targeted keywords in large
scale “open-world” scenarios, in which a large mix of non-
targeted background keywords may also be encountered?
To address these questions, we collect a large scale dataset
over a period of three months, consisting of nearly 4 million
targeted and non-targeted web search queries, using four
popular web search engines (DuckDuckGo, Google, Bing and
Yahoo), and four prominent browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge,
Safari). Our analysis reveals:
• Vulnerability With Different Search Engines: The ability
to fingerprint search queries differs significantly across
users of the four major search engines studied. Search
traffic generated by DuckDuckGo yields the highest fin-
gerprinting accuracy (up to 96%), followed by Google,
Yahoo, and Bing (up to 45%). We hypothesize that these
differences are partially due to the different levels of
tracking/advertisement/news background traffic generated
by different search engines, which is inherently dynamic
in nature and may not reflect the search keyword. The
presence of such noise hinders the ability to achieve high
classification accuracy.
• Impact of Browser: Browsers differ in how vulnerable
their traffic is to keyword fingerprinting. Furthermore, a
classifier that is trained on traffic samples from a single-
browser, can not be used successfully to test samples from
different browsers—the classification accuracy achieved
may be significantly lower. Attackers will either need
to incorporate a diverse set of browsers/devices during
training, or will need to first determine the client browser
before testing.
• Impact of Feature Selection: We evaluate prominent feature
sets used previously for website fingerprinting—the two
best performing feature sets consistently outperform in all
evaluations. Furthermore, our analysis reveals the pres-
ence of noisy traffic components that generate significant
amount of dynamic traffic that is not indicative of the
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search query keywords. When such noise is eliminated
by considering only the primary domains that are directly
related to a given search engine, classification accuracy
improves significantly for the Yahoo search engine, even
in cross-browser attacks.
• Effectiveness of Countermeasures: The presence of coun-
termeasures that obfuscate packet sizes and packet or-
dering, can significantly lower the accuracy of keyword
fingerprinting classifiers in HTTPS traffic.
• Presence of Large Number of Non-targeted Keywords: In
an open-world scenario, a user may search for any keyword
in the wild, including those not seen during training. Based
on the goal of attackers, we consider three different classifi-
cation tasks: binary classification, multi-level classification,
and multi-class classification. For each task, we consider
up to 250k non-targeted search queries for training and
testing. We find even though the classification performance
gradually degrades as the number of non-monitored testing
samples increases, it is still quite promising. For instance,
an attacker may be able to fingerprint among 1,440 targeted
keywords, in the presence of around 190k non-targeted
search samples, with nearly 90% average precision for
DuckDuckGo/Chrome.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II formu-
lates the problem, Section III summarizes our data collection
methodology. Section IV discusses the candidate feature sets
and the classification algorithm used. Section V presents
“closed-world” evaluations, and Section VI presents “open-
world” evaluations. Section VIII presents our conclusions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Keyword Fingerprinting Threat Model In this paper, we
consider the scenario in which a user uses a web search engine
and attackers eavesdrop on the HTTPS traffic traversing the
access link of the user and attempt to predict the search query
keywords sent by the user.2 For every sensitive search keyword
the attackers wants to identify, they train a machine-learning
classifier to determine, given the network traffic generated by
the web search, whether it is associated with the keyword. To
collect labeled training data, attackers repeatedly conduct web
searches for both the targeted keywords of interest to them,
as well as other popular keywords (as negative examples), and
capture the generated network traffic.
State of the Art Prior to 2012, traffic analysis had successfully
demonstrated that the deterministic packet sizes generated by
the auto-complete feature of the Google search engine can be
used to successfully fingerprint the keywords being typed by
a user [15], [64]. Since then, Google has adopted the use of
variable-length packets for a given search query with payload
randomization and compression. In [58], a stochastic algorithm
is adopted to infer the keywords—for a given word length,
a prefix tree is created to represent the set of all possible
words based on a chosen dictionary and hierarchical matching
is conducted based on the observed length of subsequent
response packets.
Oh et al. performed the first study that extends website
fingerprinting attacks to fingerprint individual web search
queries in Tor networks [48]. They considered up to 300
2“keyword” and “search query” are used interchangeably in the paper.
targeted keywords and 80,000 background keywords with
Google, Bing, and DuckDuckGo search engines. They showed
that the presence of a targeted keyword can be flagged in
Tor traffic with 80% recall and 91% precision when 10,000
non-targeted keywords are included—and the specific targeted
keyword can be identified with up to 48% accuracy.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that ex-
tends website/webpage fingerprinting analysis to fingerprinting
web search queries in modern HTTPS traffic.3 In this paper,
we fill this gap.
HTTPS vs. Tor Traffic: Information Available HTTPS
encrypts the payload of each network packet using TLS, while
providing complete access to TCP/IP headers. Furthermore,
hostname of the visited website is often revealed by the SNI
extension of TLS, or by reverse DNS of the server IP address.
Thus, we assume that the attacker already knows which web
search engine (such as google.com) is being used by the user.
Tor tunnels and routes traffic through several relay nodes
via a TLS connection. It also segments packets into fixed-size
cells (512 byte) [72]. As a consequence, and in contrast to
HTTPS traffic: (i) the packets across all TCP transfers initiated
by a web search are interleaved into one tunneled connection;
(ii) the server hostname is not visible; and (iii) the actual packet
sizes are obfuscated. In a nutshell, Tor traffic hides a lot of the
structural information that is visible in HTTPS traffic.
Why Study HTTPS Traffic? Given the above, it is natural
to ask—given that keyword fingerprinting has already been
demonstrated over a Tor network, why is it important to study
HTTPS, which seems to represent a more relaxed threat model?
We believe there are several important reasons for doing so:
• HTTPS remains the dominant transfer setting used by web
users [23], [68], [32].4 An attacker attempting keyword
fingerprinting over HTTPS is potentially targeting a much
larger fraction of Internet users. It is important to under-
stand how feasible and mitigable is such an attack.
• Features and classifiers that work well for a seemingly
stronger attack, such as Tor-based website or keyword
fingerprinting, may not work well in HTTPS [81]—a study
of the former does not subsume the latter.
• Several practical issues need to be addressed before Tor-
based keyword or website fingerprinting become feasible
in practice [53]. A significant one is that of segmenting
traffic corresponding to different webpages, which has not
yet been realized in Tor, but is easier in HTTPS due to the
access to per-connection headers and IP addresses [76].5
The state of the art is, thus, in a better position to study
the practical feasibility of HTTPS keyword fingerprinting.
3A broader discussion of related work is included in Appendix A.
4In fact, users in some countries do not even have access to advanced
anonymization networks such as Tor [42].
5It is important to note that Oh et. al. [48] attempt to show that search
query traffic can be distinguished from webpage traffic in Tor—however, the
webpage dataset used in [48] is provided by Panchenko et al. [51] while
the Tor search query dataset is collected by Oh et al. [48]—the use of two
different datasets (collected at different times and using different platforms)
raises the question of whether the high accuracy is due to the classifier’s ability
to differentiate between webpage/search query traces or differences in the the
underlying data collection setups that may make the traffic differ. For instance,
we run a simple experiment with two Tor datasets collected by Wang et al.
[74], [77]—the classifier we train is able to determine which dataset a testing
sample comes from with 100% accuracy!
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• Given the widespread usage of HTTPS, an attacker is likely
to encounter a large volume of searches in practice. It is
important for a study to use at-scale data sets that are
representative of this volume (and are much larger than
have been used in prior work).
Our Approach While it is heartening to witness the tremen-
dous growth in traffic analysis studies over the past decade, it is
also important for this line of research to avoid the pitfalls that
may lead to significant exaggeration of fingerprinting accuracy
in the real world [53], [34], [51], [3]. In this paper, we consider
the impact of several factors, many of which have been shown
in prior work to significantly influence the performance of
traffic analysis techniques:
• Client Platform Diversity: Recent studies have shown
that different client browsers may result in significant
differences in the network traffic generated—so much so,
that traffic classification accuracy is significantly impacted
when different browsers are represented in the training and
testing data sets [3]. It is, therefore, important to address
the questions: how does the use of different browsers
impact the accuracy of fingerprinting search keywords?
And do some browsers make a user more vulnerable to
keyword fingerprinting attacks?
• Feature Set Design: The choice of input features can
significantly influence the performance of a learning-based
classifier [81], [36]—distinguishing features that are stable
even in the presence of noise are likely to yield better
classification results in the real world. Hence, we ask the
question: which features yield unique signatures across
classification labels, but are also robust to the presence
of real-world noise?
• Choice of Search Engine: For a given keyword search, the
network traffic pattern generated may differ across different
web search engines. Since HTTPS traffic lets us identify
which search engine is being used, it can also help us
answer: does the use of some search engines make a user
more vulnerable to keyword fingerprinting attacks?
• Large Scale Data Collection: There are two well-accepted
observations with respect to the use of machine learning
for traffic classification: (i) training data sets that are large
as well as representative of the noise and diversity likely to
be encountered during testing, will lead to better classifier
performance in the real world; and (ii) it is important to test
a classifier in large-scale “open-world” settings that include
a large number of unseen data points—classification results
can often be exaggerations if based on small and narrow-
focused testing data. Hence, we ask in this paper: how
does keyword fingerprinting perform when larger number
of unseen keywords are encountered?
In what follows, we describe our methodology to collect and
analyze data in order to address the above questions.
III. DATASET
A. Selecting Search Query Keywords
Targeted Keywords For the purpose of this study, we consider
the context in which the attacker is interested in tracking
whether a given user is interested in blacklisted/sensitive
content. For creating the corresponding list of targeted search
keywords, we use 447 keywords blacklisted from Google
Instant6 [43] (as reported by 2600.com [10]), as well as 1,000
keywords that are considered sensitive in China [16].
Non-targeted Background Keywords When collecting traffic
from a given population of users, an attacker is likely to
encounter web search traffic for non-targeted keywords as
well—the additional task for the attacker, then, is to sift
through the web searches to identify those that include targeted
keywords. In order to understand the problem of keyword
fingerprinting in the real world, therefore, it is important to
study the “open-world” setting, in which regular background
search traffic is also incorporated.
We assume that background web search traffic is modeled
well by including popular search queries. For this, we consider
the most popular queries reported by a commercial keyword
tool [35], for two region/language settings: Global/English
and Hong Kong/Chinese Simplified (China)—given an input
sequence of characters, this tool returns a list of suggested
search keywords that either start with that sequence or contain
that sequence as a substring. The tool also provides the
average number of search per month for each suggested search
keyword. To harvest the most popular keywords for each
region, we adopt a 3-step approach:
1) First, we extract the complete list of all suggested search
queries that start with each of the 26 alphabet characters
a-z.
2) From the above list, then, we select search queries
that log more than 50,000 average search volume per
month—this step yields 2,647 and 1,814 keywords for
the Global/English and Hong Kong/Chinese Simplified
settings, respectively.
3) For each search query obtained in the second step above
(e.g., “apple”), we then input it back to the keyword
tool [35]—which returns a list of suggested search terms
that contain that search query in them (e.g., “apple sauce”).
In this step, we select all query phrases that log more than
3,000 average search volume per month.
Our final list of background keywords consist of all search
terms harvested in steps two and three above—in total, we
harvest around 235,767 background keywords, with a diverse
span of topics.7 The average search volume for these keywords
during 2018 was around 2.89 × 1011, which is about 1,052
hours of Google search volume according to [69].
Semantic closeness of Non-targeted Keywords Users may
differ in how they search for a given topic – for instance, a user
may prefer “tv” while another user may consider “television”
instead. To reflect the variations, non-targeted keyword list is
supposed to contain queries that are semantically close to each
other. Thus we measure the semantic closeness of non-targeted
keywords with a commonly-used technique in natural language
processing. Specifically, we first embed the keywords and then
calculate the cosine similarity between their embedding. By
manually investigating groups of keywords grouped based on
cosine similarity, we found 0.8 to be a reasonable threshold to
6Google Instant has been deprecated since 2017 [61] and not used in the
paper.
7Examples of non-targeted search keywords can be found in Appendix B.
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balance between the variation and semantic similarity.8 Fig. 1
shows the distribution of the number of non-targeted keywords
with cosine similarity equal to or larger than 0.8. The results
indicate that around 53% of keywords are unique while 17%
of them have one semantic similar neighbor.
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Fig. 1: Distribution of non-targeted keywords with cosine
similarity equal or larger than 0.8.
B. Data Collection Methodology
Web Search Engines We focus on four web search en-
gines for our analysis—Google (www.google.com), Yahoo
(www.yahoo.com), Bing (www.bing.com) and DuckDuckGo
(duckduckgo.com). The first three of these are the most popular
web search engines worldwide [17], while DuckDuckGo is the
default search engine used in the Tor browser—a prominent
feature of DuckDuckGo is that it claims to enhance user
privacy by not tracking users as well as by blocking hidden
trackers from Google [78].
Client Browsers In order to study the impact of diverse client
browser platforms on keyword fingerprinting, we consider
four different browsers—Firefox, Chrome, Edge and Safari.
A majority of the data is collected using Firefox and Chrome,
which are run on 12 virtual machines and 3 desktop machines
with Ubuntu 17.10. Edge instances are run on 8 Windows 10
virtual machines on Microsoft Azure [7], while Safari instances
are running on a Mac Mini device with macOS High Sierra.
We use Docker containers on the Linux virtual machines in
order to scale data collection with Firefox and Chrome.
Our closed-world dataset is collected using all 4 browsers,
while our larger open-world dataset is collected using Chrome.
Automated Traffic Capture We use Selenium for web browser
automation [63]. We define a search session as the process
of issuing a search using a given combination of keyword,
browser, and web search engine. Within each search session,
after successfully instantiating the browser, we capture the
network traffic using either tcpdump9 on macOS/Ubuntu or
WinDump10 on Windows 10.
Furthermore, a search session is divided into two con-
secutive phases. The first phase opens the homepage of the
web search engine (e.g., duckduckgo.com), while the second
8An example list of keywords with a cosine similarity more than 0.8 are
“maps maroon 5 lyrics”, “maps by maroon 5 lyrics”, “maps maroon 5” and
“maps lyrics”.
9https://www.tcpdump.org
10https://www.winpcap.org/windump/
phase simulates the typing of the search query by the user and
pressing ENTER after the last character is typed. In order to
capture all the information conveyed by auto-complete during
typing, we impose a 1 second delay before typing the next
character.11 After loading the search page, we wait for an
additional 5 seconds before stopping tcpdump/WinDump and
closing the browser. Consequently, along with the actual search
results, traffic related to loading the search engine homepage
as well as auto-complete is also captured.
Simulating User Searching Modes There are two prominent
web search modes used by Internet users—homepage search-
ing, in which a user first visits the homepage of the web
search engine and then types in a query in the search box, and
addressbar searching, in which a user directly searches from
the browser address-bar (with the configured default search
engine) without visiting the homepage of the search engine.
In order to study keyword fingerprinting under both modes, we
consider network traffic as follows. For homepage searching,
we consider all network traffic collected for a given search
session. For addressbar searching, we filter out all packets
captured before typing the first character in the search box.12
C. Dataset Summary
TABLE I summarizes the total number of targeted and non-
targeted search sessions captured with different web search
engines and client browsers. This dataset is collected over a
three month period, in two phases. The first phase lasts seven
weeks and focuses on studying the influence of several factors
in a closed-world scenario. For a given browser platform, we
conduct search sessions with the four search engines in a
round-robin manner, iterating multiple times over the different
targeted keywords.13 Within the first phase, we successfully
searched 1,440 targeted keywords each at least 54 times using
Chrome and Firefox, 40 times using Edge, and 4 times using
Safari.14
The second phase lasted six weeks and focused on open-
world data collection, using only the Chrome browser and
with the DuckDuckGo and Google search engines—this phase
conducted search sessions with both targeted and non-targeted
keywords. We randomly iterate over the non-targeted key-
words, and randomly insert targeted keyword queries in be-
tween. Overall, each non-targeted keyword is queried at least
5 times each with DuckDuckGo and Google, and each targeted
keyword is queried at least 106 times.
In total, our dataset contains nearly 4 million search query
visits with four search engines and browsers, including both
targeted and non-targeted search queries.15
11In practice, the interval is likely to be smaller than 1s. In Appendix C,
we study how typing speeds affect the traffic trace and the vulnerability of
being fingerprinted—we do not find any obvious correlation.
12For TCP connections that are established before typing the first character
in the search box, we filter out only the packets observed before typing—since
these may be persistent connections that are used to later carry search traffic.
13Due to access to several Linux platforms, data collection with Firefox
and Chrome on Ubuntu 17.10 took significantly less time.
14Due to limited availability of Apple devices, search sessions conducted
using Safari are used for testing only (not for training the machine learning
classifiers).
15The dataset can be shared to assist future studies per request.
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TABLE I: Total Number of Search Sessions Captured
Google Bing Yahoo DuckDuckGo Time Span
Closed World Scenario
Edge 81,020 80,832 84,662 88,246 Jan-Feb, 2019
Safari 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 Jan-Feb, 2019
Chrome-cw 98,296 98,316 97,610 98,327 Feb, 2019
Firefox 94,757 94,848 93,462 94,919 Feb, 2019
Open World Scenario
Chrome-ow 1,223,727 1,223,696 Feb-Mar, 2019
Chrome-targeted 150,011 150,023 Feb-Mar, 2019
IV. FEATURE SETS CONSIDERED
The performance of learning-based classification may be
significantly influenced by the choice of input features. Indeed,
in the traffic analysis literature, several different types of
features have been derived from the headers of TCP/IP network
traffic for the purpose of website and webpage fingerprinting,
especially in the context of Tor traffic [75], [34], [74], [30],
[51], [81], [36]. In this paper, we consider and evaluate the fol-
lowing five feature sets—none of these have been considered in
the context of keyword fingerprinting over HTTPS traffic, but
most have been shown to yield good classification performance
in their respective application domains:
• k-FP (2016): K-fingerprinting is devised for fingerprinting
web page visits over Tor using features based on packet
number and ordering—including number of packets, ratio
of incoming/outgoing packets, packet ordering, number
of packets per second, concentration of outgoing packets,
packet inter-arrival time, and the overall transmission time
[30].
• SvmResp/EtResp (2017): Targeted search keywords are
identified in [48] by combining informative features for
website fingerprinting, as well as additional novel fea-
tures in Tor. The features considered include number
of total/incoming/outgoing packets, number of incoming
bursts,16 and the cumulative size of TLS records. We use
the code provided by Oh et al. [49] for feature extraction.
• Wfin (2018): Recent work on website fingerprinting has
focused on extracting many more features than considered
previously [81], [36]. Yan and Kaur [81] extract and
analyze the importance of more than 36,000 fine-grained
features (grouped into more than 100 feature categories)
in different communication scenarios.17 Feature selection
is conducted based on the importance of each feature cate-
gory for classification—the selected feature categories are
then used for website fingerprinting classification. Yan and
Kaur [81] show that Wfin achieves comparable or better
website fingerprinting accuracy in several communication
scenarios, including HTTPS. We use the code provided by
the authors of [81] to select features for each combination
of search engine, browser, browsing mode.
• Wfin++: We also derive from Wfin a feature set in two
steps. First, inspired by features introduced in [48] for
fingerprinting search keywords in Tor traffic, in addition to
the 109 feature categories identified in [81], we introduce
features such as the sequence of reversed cumulative
size of packets/bursts, total number of packets, maximum
16A burst is defined as a sequence of back-to-back packets sent in one
direction between two packets sent from the opposite direction [52].
17Examples of features considered for HTTPS traffic are packet size count,
burst size count, total No. of TCP connections, transmitted bytes w.r.t. port
443, and hostname count (details in Section 11 of [81]).
packet size, and the average packet size in the largest
incoming burst.
Second, in order to alleviate the impact of noise when
too many features are considered [33], we reduce the final
feature list returned by Wfin by computing the validation
accuracy yielded by the top-N most informative features.
We select the N that yields the highest validation accuracy
and use only the corresponding top-N features for keyword
fingerprinting—details are in Appendix D. The resultant
feature reduction also helps reduce the need for intensive
memory and computation resources with our large scale
datasets.
• Packet Size Count (PSC): Packet size count, for a given
traffic direction, is the frequency of each packet size
encountered—it has been shown to be one of the most
informative features for identifying individual web pages
under both HTTPS and encrypted tunnels [37], [31], [45],
[81], [3]. Thus we also consider packet size count as the
baseline feature set.
Machine Learning Algorithms Prior studies have used differ-
ent types of machine learning algorithms for traffic analysis,
including multinomial Bayes [31], Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [59], and decision tree-based ensemble methods, in-
cluding Random Forests [11] and Extra-Trees [24]. Among
these, SVM and decision tree-based ensemble methods are able
to achieve consistently high performance [30], [51], [81]—
SvmResp uses SVM with 10-fold cross validation for param-
eters tuning, k-FP directly/indirectly uses Random Forests,18
while Wfin uses Extra-Trees. We observe in our evaluations
that: (i) for large scale datasets, SVM has a prohibitively
high training overhead during cross-validation; and (ii) with
comparable performance, Extra-Trees is more computationally
efficient than Random Forests, due to the randomization of
cut-point choices and the use of whole learning samples for
growing the trees [24]—hence, we choose Extra-Trees with the
above five features sets for both closed-world and open-world
evaluations.19
V. CLOSED WORLD EVALUATIONS
We start with the “closed-world” assumption (the attacker
knows in advance that the search keyword to be fingerprinted
belongs to a small known targeted set of keywords)—we
use this constrained scenario to investigate the impact of five
important factors on the performance of fingerprinting search
keywords, including (1) the choice of search engines; (2) the
traffic features used for classification; (3) the impact of client
browser platforms; (4) the choice of searching modes; and
(5) the impact of the increasing time gap between training
and testing. In this section, we primarily use the closed-world
dataset summarized in TABLE I.
A. Vulnerability of Different Search Engines
One of the key differences between HTTPS and Tor traffic
is that the attacker may be able to learn which search engine is
used by the user in the former case, based on the IP address of
18In closed-world settings, k-FP directly uses the classification output of
the Random Forest; for open-world settings, the output of the forest is used
as features to fit into k-NN.
19Performance of SVM and Extra-Trees is compared in Appendix E.
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Fig. 2: Network traffic generated using Chrome (caption below each sub-figure indicates the time of search)
the server as well as the server name in the SNI extension of
TLS [47], [26]. That is, the attacker can be assumed to know
that a user is visiting google.com—but the attacker wants to
fingerprint the keywords that the user is using for their search
query. Thus the first question we ask is: among Google, Bing,
Yahoo and DuckDuckGo, which web search engine makes a
user more vulnerable/robust to keyword fingerprinting?
To answer this question, we use our searches for the 1,440
targeted keywords on Yahoo, Bing, Google and DuckDuckGo,
using Firefox, Chrome, and Edge.20 For Chrome and Firefox,
the targeted dataset is split into three disjoint subsets for
training, validation and testing, with the ratio of 4:1:1—for
every 6 consecutive visits of a search query, the first 4 samples
are used for training, the 5th for validation, and the 6th for
testing.21 Since each keyword is queried at least 54 times in the
closed-world datasets for Chrome and Firefox, we consider 36
training samples, 9 validation samples, and 9 testing samples
during evaluation of each targeted keyword. The validation
dataset is used for tuning parameters in Extra-Trees and for
deriving the feature sets for Wfin and Wfin++. To obtain test
accuracy, we include both training and validation samples for
building the machine learning model, and use test samples for
20Results with the Edge browser are included in Appendix F.
21The reason for adopting this sub-sampling scheme is to minimize the
time gap between training and testing samples (the impact of time will be
explicitly studied in Section V-E). In practice, it is indeed possible for the
attacker to capture training and testing traces close in time, if it is an offline
testing model.
the fingerprinting evaluation (45:9 samples).22
TABLE II: Classification Accuracy Achieved (%)
Chrome Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 44.86 ± 0.07 64.63 ± 0.24 60.32 ± 0.07 96.15 ± 0.01
PSC 44.98 ± 0.12 57.66 ± 0.09 57.72 ± 0.05 96.33 ± 0.04
Wfin 41.63 ± 0.02 52.57 ± 0.05 58.25 ± 0.14 94.06 ± 0.04
EtResp 15.54 ± 0.06 0.57 ± 0.03 27.39 ± 0.07 42.38 ± 0.08
k-FP 8.95 ± 0.08 1.48 ± 0.06 20.70 ± 0.14 33.45 ± 0.08
Firefox Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 44.73 ± 0.13 58.14 ± 0.23 75.56 ± 0.07 91.95 ± 0.10
PSC 44.83 ± 0.08 49.90 ± 0.11 76.75 ± 0.02 92.23 ± 0.02
Wfin 41.22 ± 0.03 43.06 ± 0.09 73.55 ± 0.21 89.70 ± 0.03
EtResp 8.07 ± 0.10 0.12 ± 0.01 24.07 ± 0.02 28.08 ± 0.06
k-FP 5.34 ± 0.06 0.81 ± 0.03 9.69 ± 0.06 15.82 ± 0.17
TABLE II summarizes the test accuracy (mean and stan-
dard deviation) for fingerprinting among 1,440 targeted key-
words, obtained with different feature sets and search engines.
We find that:
• Feature Sets: As reported for website fingerprinting [81],
feature sets that work well for Tor may not work well
for HTTPS—the performance of EtResp and k-FP are not
comparable to Wfin, Wfin++, or PSC. For instance, the
accuracy obtained for DuckDuckGo/Chrome is around 33-
42% with EtResp and k-FP, but ranges around 94-96% for
the others.
22In Extra-Trees classifier, the split criteria is Gini Index with bootstrap
disabled and the number of trees is set to 700. Details about parameter tuning
are included in Appendix H.
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Second, the Wfin++ feature set outperforms Wfin in all
cases—the performance gains are as large as 15% for
Yahoo/Firefox. In the rest of this paper, we only consider
the derived Wfin++.
Finally, PSC and Wfin++ outperform each other in differ-
ent cases. However, Wfin++ performs at least comparably
well in all cases, while PSC may sometimes yield a
significantly lower accuracy (Yahoo).
• Search Engines: Among the four web search engines, traf-
fic generated by targeted keywords with DuckDuckGo are
most vulnerable to be fingerprinted—the highest accuracy
achieved (boxed in Table II) with DuckDuckGo is above
96%, while it ranges from 44% (Bing) to 76% (Google) for
the rest. Below, we further investigate differences across
search engines.
• Client Browsers: The vulnerability of fingerprinting
searches on a given search engine also depends on the
client browser used—this is most notable for Google,
in which targeted keywords can be identified with 76%
accuracy when using Firefox, but only 60% accuracy
when using Chrome. We further investigate the impact of
browsers in Section V-C.
• HTTPS vs. Tor: For Google, the highest keyword
fingerprinting accuracy achieved with 1,400 keywords in
the closed-world setting of TABLE II ranges from 60%
to 76% with different client browsers. The closed-world
fingerprinting accuracy achieved for Google with 100
keywords in the Tor browser in [48] was around 64%.
However, it is important to resist the urge to compare
these numbers—the dataset used in [48] is very different
from the one used here (most notably, in the time period
of data collection, the number of targeted keywords, and
the number of training/testing samples). In Appendix E,
we provide a brief comparison of HTTPS and Tor by
carefully controlling factors during data collection. In
Appendix I we study the impact of smaller number of
keywords on the classification accuracy (we find that
the accuracy of fingerprinting Google/Chrome keywords
increases from 60% to 80% as the number of targeted
keywords is reduced to 100).
To understand what makes the search engines differently
vulnerable to keyword fingerprinting, we examine the network
traffic. Fig. 2 illustrates the traffic generated using Chrome
with four search engines, when searching for a specific targeted
keyword at four different times within five hours on Feb 24-
25, 2019. The x-axis represents the packet index within each
TCP transfer, and the y-axis represents the index of the TCP
connection in the network trace.23 Different colors are used
to describe the packet length together with the direction (“-
” sign indicates packets sent from the client to the server).
We observe that the network traffic differs significantly, when
searching the exact same query at approximately the same time
across different search engines (any given column in Fig. 2).
In TABLE III, we summarize statistics with respect to the
number of packets generated and number of TCP connections
23Only the first 100 packets in each TCP connection are depicted for ease
of visualization. TCP connections are sorted according to the timestamp of
the first packet observed in each TCP connection. The time gap between the
start of different TCP connection is not shown in the figure.
initiated by the four search engines, for all search sessions
collected using Chrome. We observe that:
TABLE III: Network Traffic Statistics (Chrome)
Yahoo Bing Google DuckDuckGo
Median no. of packets 2989 1476 1195 723
Std Dev of no. of packets 343.3 192.3 128.1 66.1
Median no. of TCP conn. 27 4 8 6
Std Dev of no. of TCP conn. 6.4 0.7 3.2 1.1
Median homepage load time (s) 3.05 0.52 1.00 1.05
TABLE IV: Second-level Server Names (Chrome)
2019-02-23-23-58-37 2019-02-24-01-02-04
duckduckgo.com 6 duckduckgo.com 5
2019-02-24-02-03-54 2019-02-24-03-01-04
duckduckgo.com 6 duckduckgo.com 6
(a) DuckDuckGo
2019-02-23-23-58-39 2019-02-24-01-02-06
yimg.com 9 yimg.com 9
yahoo.com 5 yahoo.com 6
adtechus.com 1 atwola.com 5
atwola.com 1 scorecardresearch.com 1
scorecardresearch.com 1 adtechus.com 1
google.com 1 nexac.com 1
bing.com 1 addthis.com 1
google.com 1
bing.com 1
2019-02-24-02-03-55 2019-02-24-03-01-05
yimg.com 9 yimg.com 9
yahoo.com 6 yahoo.com 6
atwola.com 5 bing.net 6
yahoodns.net 5 atwola.com 5
scorecardresearch.com 1 scorecardresearch.com 1
adtechus.com 1 adtechus.com 1
krxd.net 1 krxd.net 1
nexac.com 1 bing.com 1
addthis.com 1
google.com 1
bing.com 1
(b) Yahoo
• Amount of Traffic Generated: The median number of
packets (as well as standard deviation) is largest for Yahoo,
followed by Bing, Google, and DuckDuckGo (TABLE III).
A smaller number of packets may result from simpler
content in the responses returned for a search query. For
example, most of the responses returned by DuckDuckGo
are text-based, in contrast to a significant presence of
image-based responses from the other three search engines.
• Third-party Connections: Yahoo initiates a much larger
number of TCP connections (and with largest deviation).
To understand who a user communicates with when us-
ing different search engines, we study the second-level
server names extracted from the SNI extension field of
TLS in the network traces of Fig. 2. TABLE IV lists
the number of TCP connections initiated to different
servers when using DuckDuckGo and Yahoo. While Duck-
DuckGo searches contact only duckduckgo.com for serv-
ing query results, Yahoo searches involve communicating
with several third-party servers. Among those servers,
some are owned by other web search engines, such as
google.com and bing.com,24 while some are other market-
ing/advertisement service providers, such as adtechus.com
24By further inspecting the traffic, we observe contents retrieved
under google.com are mostly from ade.googlesyndication.com,
www.googletagservices.com and googleads.g.doubleclick.net. On the other
hand, Yahoo retrieved some images on the result page from bing.com [12].
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Fig. 3: Linear Discriminant Analysis (200 targeted search queries, using PSC as feature)
[2], scorecardresearch.com [62] and atwola.com [6]. Con-
tent served from marketing and advertisement servers can
be quite dynamic—we believe this adds significant noise to
the traffic that contains the actual search query results, and
may affect the classification accuracy. Hence the accuracy
achieved with Yahoo is relatively lower.
• Stability of Response Over Time: Overall, the generated
traffic pattern for the same search query—packet ordering
and packet sequence within each TCP connection—is
relatively more stable over time with DuckDuckGo and
Bing, compared to the other two search engines (Fig. 2).
Such stability ensures greater similarity between training
and test samples and helps attackers fingerprint with higher
accuracy. Thus, fingerprinting accuracy with DuckDuckGo
is expected to be high (TABLE II).
• Identifiability of Keywords: Finally, we perform linear
discriminant analysis [44] using Bing, DuckDuckGo, and
Yahoo traffic samples, and using packet size count as
features. We consider 200 targeted search queries from
the training dataset, each with 36 samples, and project
them onto the three-dimensional subspace that optimizes
both the variance of the data and the separation be-
tween different search keywords in Fig. 3—different colors
and markers represent different search keywords. As can
be seen, samples associated with different keywords are
more densely clustered with Bing, while these are more
separable with DuckDuckGo—which indicates that it is
much easier to separate samples for different keywords
collected by DuckDuckGo, as compared to Bing. Thus,
even though Bing does not generate significant third party
connections,25 the accuracy is still low due to similarity
between traces associated with different keywords.
For Yahoo, samples for the same keyword do not cluster
as well as the other two, possibly due to the dynamic
background and third-party traffic—which explains a lower
classification accuracy.
B. Homepage vs. Addressbar Searching
Users may enter keywords either in the search box on
the homepage of a search engine, or directly in the ad-
dress bar of their browser (using the default search engine).
We simulate two corresponding searching modes—homepage
searching and addressbar searching—depending on whether
25Most Bing/Chrome traffic traces consists of 4 TCP connections – one
connection from each of bing.com, bingparachute.com, live.com and microsoft-
online.com.
or not we include the network traffic generated when loading
the homepage of the search engine. TABLE V summarizes the
accuracy obtained in addressbar searching mode with 1,440
targeted keywords using the same setup as in Section V-A.
Compared with the results obtained in homepage searching
mode (TABLE II), we observe:
TABLE V: Classification Accuracy: Addressbar Searching
Chrome Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 45.18 ± 0.07 86.62 ± 0.08 64.05 ± 0.06 96.51 ± 0.02
PSC 45.69 ± 0.14 84.22 ± 0.02 59.05 ± 0.05 96.61 ± 0.02
EtResp 21.54 ± 0.04 0.80 ± 0.02 28.61 ± 0.05 55.59 ± 0.06
k-FP 8.97 ± 0.12 2.83 ± 0.03 26.24 ± 0.13 41.12 ± 0.09
Firefox Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 45.76 ± 0.05 86.00 ± 0.04 78.44 ± 0.13 92.87 ± 0.03
PSC 45.69 ± 0.17 83.65 ± 0.13 79.27 ± 0.08 92.44 ± 0.04
EtResp 13.06 ± 0.12 0.61 ± 0.03 25.58 ± 0.09 29.85 ± 0.03
k-FP 7.49 ± 0.06 3.27 ± 0.02 17.77 ± 0.06 25.98 ± 0.04
• For Bing, Google, DuckDuckGo, the fingerprinting ac-
curacy achieved with Chrome increase significantly with
EtResp and k-FP, but increases only slightly with PSC and
Wfin++. Since EtResp and k-FP use more coarse-grained
features such as statistical derivatives of number of packets
(versus fine-grained features such as packet size count used
in PSC and Wfin++), their performance is more likely to be
impaired by the additional noise introduced in homepage
searching.
• For Yahoo, the performance is increased significantly even
with Wfin++—from 60% to 86%. This may be attributed to
the elimination of dynamic traffic generated when loading
the homepage of Yahoo, which contains news, weather,
and ads. Indeed, when we repeat the analysis of Fig. 2 for
the addressbar searching mode with Yahoo, we observe a
significant decrease in the number of packets as well as
number of TCP connections (details in Appendix J).
In what follows, we present evaluations with only Wfin++ and
PSC, and homepage searching results are included only in the
appendices.
C. Impact of Disregarding Client Platforms?
Alan and Kaur [3] show that differences in client browser
platforms represented in training and test data can signifi-
cantly impair the accuracy of fingerprinting webpages. Our
evaluations presented so far have trained and tested with data
collected using the same client browser. Next, we investigate
the performance of keyword fingerprinting in cross-browser
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attacks (that train with data from one type of browser and test
with another), using Wfin++ and PSC.
To minimize the variations introduced by different time
of data collection on classification performance, we study the
cross-browser impact with Firefox vs. Chrome samples (both
collected in Feb 2019), and with Edge vs. Safari samples (both
collected in Jan-Feb 2019).26 For comparison, we also evaluate
the classification accuracy when training with samples from
both Firefox and Chrome browsers.
TABLE VI: Classification Accuracy: Cross-browser Attacks in
Addressbar Searching
DDG Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 92.87 ± 0.03 92.44 ± 0.04 0.69 ± 0.06 0.91 ± 0.03
Chrome 0.80 ± 0.06 1.54 ± 0.07 96.51 ± 0.02 96.61 ± 0.02
Fire/Chr 92.26 ± 0.03 92.18 ± 0.03 96.49 ± 0.02 96.52 ± 0.04
Google Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 78.44 ± 0.13 79.27 ± 0.08 1.41 ± 0.08 1.61 ± 0.04
Chrome 1.65 ± 0.08 0.77 ± 0.01 64.05 ± 0.06 59.05 ± 0.05
Fire/Chr 77.57 ± 0.22 77.62 ± 0.05 64.94 ± 0.09 58.48 ± 0.17
Yahoo Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 85.95 ± 0.09 83.63 ± 0.13 53.19 ± 0.52 48.68 ± 0.59
Chrome 22.09 ± 0.38 25.39 ± 0.63 86.66 ± 0.11 84.17 ± 0.08
Fire/Chr 85.66 ± 0.17 83.71 ± 0.19 85.65 ± 0.07 83.88 ± 0.27
The classification results with Google, DuckDuckGo, and
Yahoo are displayed in TABLE VI. In both addressbar search-
ing and homepage searching modes, we find that when there is
a mismatch between the training browser and testing browser,
the classification accuracy is significantly lower. For instance,
when the classifier is trained with DuckDuckGo/Firefox, the
classification accuracy is around 92% using test samples from
DuckDuckGo/Firefox, but is less than 1% while using test sam-
ples from DuckDuckGo/Chrome. An attacker that disregards
the client browser platform, may fail in practice.
Furthermore, the performance achieved by including sam-
ples from both Firefox and Chrome during training is com-
parable to (or even slightly better than) what is achieved
when trained with a single matching browser. For instance,
when testing with DuckDuckGo/Chrome, the accuracy ob-
tained by PSC and Wfin++ is around 96% in both cases. This
observation stresses the importance of incorporating diverse
browser platforms during training, in order to achieve good
fingerprinting accuracy in practice.
Browser Specific Communication We next examine browser-
specific communication—TABLE VII lists the second-level
server names observed uniquely in Firefox (not observed in
Chrome), with DuckDuckGo and Yahoo. We find that Firefox
generates a significant fraction of connections to its own
servers—mozilla.com, mozilla.net and mozilla.org (this was
true across all four search engines—DuckDuckGo: 40.06%,
Google: 33.53%, Bing: 39.93%, and Yahoo: 9.73%). Further-
more, almost all unique connections came from mozilla servers
when Firefox used DuckDuckGo, Google, and Bing; however,
many other unique server names were observed with Yahoo,
such as alephd.com and smartadserver.com—this indicates the
26Cross-browser attack results with Edge vs. Safari are included in Ap-
pendix M.
impact of different browsers may also differ across search
engines. This also suggests that the appearance of unique
server names in a network trace may be used by an attacker
to infer the browser (and then select the corresponding trained
model for fingerprinting). An attacker may also train a multi-
class classifier using features based on server names to help
identify the browser [82].
TABLE VII: Firefox-specific Server Names
Rank Server name Popularity (Continued)
DuckDuckGo (40.06%) 9 specificmedia.com 0.08%
1 mozilla.com 22.89% 10 adroll.com 0.06%
2 mozilla.net 11.45% 11 reson8.com 0.04%
3 mozilla.org 5.72% 12 3lift.com 0.03%
Yahoo (10.76%) 13 marriott.com 0.03%
1 mozilla.com 5.56% 14 impdesk.com 0.03%
2 mozilla.net 2.78% 15 yieldmo.com 0.03%
3 mozilla.org 1.39% 16 pswec.com 0.03%
4 alephd.com 0.14% 17 media.net 0.03%
5 smartadserver.com 0.12% 18 solocpm.com 0.02%
6 vindicosuite.com 0.12% 19 webmd.com 0.02%
7 jivox.com 0.11% 20 extend.tv 0.02%
8 akamaihd.net 0.1%
D. Eliminate Noise From “Other” Domains?
Based on our observations so far, there are at least two
sources of noisy background traffic—tracking/advertisement
connections, and browser specific connections—that (even
in addressbar searching mode) may hinder achieving high
fingerprinting accuracy. To eliminate such noise, we next study
keyword fingerprinting when only TCP connections that serve
the actual search results are considered. Specifically, based on
manual analysis, we include connections from google.com and
gstatic.com for Google, duckduckgo.com for DuckDuckGo,
bing.com for Bing, and yahoo.com for Yahoo.27
TABLE VIII summarizes the classification accuracy
achieved with Yahoo. We observe a significant increase in
classification accuracy, from around 86% (TABLE V) to 95%
(increase was less significant for the other search engines—
see Appendix N). More importantly, the accuracy is high for
Yahoo even in cross-browser attacks—around 91% when train-
ing (testing) with Chrome (Firefox), and 82% when training
(testing) with Firefox (Chrome).28 Thus, we find that when
significant amount of noise from other domains is eliminated,
keyword fingerprinting may become vulnerable to even cross-
browser attacks.
E. How Often to Re-train Classifier?
The auto-suggestion list and search results returned by a
search engine depend on the current social trends and can
be quite dynamic over time—thus, an attacker may need to
27It is natural to ask—can noisy (and irrelevant) background traffic be re-
moved automatically by using feature selection techniques? For that, we would
need to define existing features at an additional domain-level granularity—e.g.,
instead of just packet size count, we would need to define packet size count
w.r.t. domain X, for all encountered domains X. That will lead to an explosion
of the feature space due to a large number of unique domains, especially when
large feature sets are considered [30], [81], [36]. It also adds to the curse of
dimensionality problem [21]. Instead, we select the manual analysis approach.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has attempted elimination of
traffic from other domains.
28We did not observe any significant improvement in Google, Bing, and
DuckDuckGo by eliminating connections from other domains, since the traffic
of these contains only a limited number of third-party connections.
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TABLE VIII: Classification Accuracy (only yahoo.com con-
nections considered with Yahoo, addressbar searching mode)
Yahoo Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 94.60 ± 0.03 94.37 ± 0.05 91.39 ± 0.09 91.65 ± 0.12
Chrome 76.91 ± 0.15 82.09 ± 0.18 96.27 ± 0.03 96.16 ± 0.06
frequently re-train the machine learning model to keep up its
performance. In order to understand how frequently the model
may need to be updated in a closed-world scenario, we next
study how the classification accuracy changes as the time gap
between training and test samples is increased. For this, we
focus on Chrome and use the first 36 samples (out of 54)
for each of the 1,440 targeted keywords for training, next
9 samples (37-45) for validation, and test with five datasets
(test-3/4/8/10/14) collected in different time periods. Each
test dataset is composed of 9 samples for each of the 1,440
targeted keywords—test-3 contains the last 9 samples (out of
54) from the Chrome-cw dataset (TABLE I); test-4/8/10/14
are composed of samples from the Chrome-targeted dataset
collected during the second phase.
TABLE IX: Classification Accuracy: Impact of Time (Chrome,
addressbar searching mode)
Gap (Hours) (20-30) (38-66) (164- 188) (219-244) (331-352)
DDG test-3 test-4 test-8 test-10 test-14
Wfin++ 92.20 90.86 81.84 72.90 72.46
PSC 92.85 91.09 80.34 69.65 69.15
Google test-3 test-4 test-8 test-10 test-14
Wfin++ 55.14 43.34 22.53 19.99 22.16
PSC 47.74 34.67 9.75 10.14 14.72
TABLE IX summarizes the classification accuracy (ad-
dressbar searching mode) against the time gap between the last
training sample and the testing samples (specified as a range
in number of hours). As expected, the accuracy decreases as
the time gap between training and testing samples increases.
However, the rate of decline differs across search engines.
For instance, the accuracy achieved with Google decreases
from 55% to 22%, while with DuckDuckGo, it decreases from
92% to 72%.29 Thus, in order to achieve high fingerprinting
accuracy, an attacker may need to re-train their classifier every
30 hours for Google and every 66 hours for DuckDuckGo. The
lower retraining frequency needed for DuckDuckGo further
strengthens our observation in Section V-A about the stability
of samples over time.
VI. OPEN WORLD EVALUATIONS
Our Objective We next go beyond the “closed-world” as-
sumption and consider the more realistic scenario in which
the user may search for many keywords in the wild—the
goal of the attacker is then to either: (i) determine whether
the user is searching for one of the targeted keywords, or
(ii) further identify the specific targeted keyword. The first
goal can be formalized as a binary classification problem.
The second goal can be pursued by either applying an ad-
ditional classifier trained with only targeted keywords, after
differentiating targeted samples from non-targeted ones with
the binary classifier (multi-level classification), or by training
a new classifier using both targeted and non-targeted samples
29Similar trend is observed in homepage searching (Appx. L: TABLE IX).
to directly determine which targeted keyword is being searched
for by the user (multi-class classification). Our aim is to study:
(i) is keyword fingerprinting indeed a potential privacy concern
in open-world scenarios? (ii) how does the number of non-
targeted training and testing samples affect the classification
performance? (iii) which classification scheme is likely to yield
better performance for an attacker?
How Many Non-targeted Keywords Can Be Encountered?
The number of non-targeted keywords represented in our
dataset is 200K+. This corresponds to roughly 2-3 seconds
worth of worldwide query traffic processed by Google [69].
Furthermore, according to [20], the average load time of a
webpage was 3.21 seconds in 2017. Given our threat model, in
which an attacker is eavesdropping on the access link of a user,
the volume of search queries he/she may encounter during a 3
second search session is likely to be significantly smaller than
200K. Thus, we believe our dataset is representative enough
of the scale that an attacker may encounter in practice.
Limiting the Time Effect Our closed-world evaluations
revealed that search traffic signatures can change with time,
requiring frequent classifier re-training to achieve high perfor-
mance. In order to reduce the impact of time in our open-world
evaluations: (i) each keyword should be searched at approx-
imately the same time with different search engines; and (ii)
targeted and non-targeted keywords should be visited in similar
time spans. Given our scale of 200K+ keywords, visiting
each non-targeted keyword once, with even one search engine,
takes more than 3 days. Thus, for open-world evaluations,
we focus only on the DuckDuckGo and Google search en-
gines, with Chrome browser in addressbar searching mode—
DuckDuckGo is the most vulnerable to keyword fingerprinting
(Section V), while Google is the most popular search engine
worldwide. For classifiers, we consider two best-performing
feature sets in the closed-world scenario, Wfin++ and PSC,
with Extra-Trees (n estimators = 700).30 We use the open-
world dataset (TABLE I)—45 samples are used for training
and 9 for testing for each targeted keyword; and 1 sample is
considered for either training or testing for each selected non-
targeted search keyword (from a list of 235,767 keywords).
The maximum number of testing samples in our experiments
is around 203k (including both targeted and non-targeted ones).
A. Binary Classification
We first consider the attacker task of determining whether
or not a given user query is searching for a targeted keyword—
this can be formulated as a binary classification problem with
two labels: targeted or non-targeted. To evaluate classification
performance, we consider:
• Precision-Recall-Curve (PRCbc): PRCbc is based on two
evaluation measures—precision and recall.31 Precision, a
measure of exactness, is the fraction of samples that are
correctly classified, when being classified as a targeted
one ( TPTP+FP ); Recall, a measure of completeness, is the
fraction of targeted samples that are classified correctly
30k-FP and EtResp do not perform as well even in closed-world evaluations.
We do not expect them to perform well in open-world scenarios, which are
more challenging due to large volumes of unseen non-targeted keywords.
31PRC is generated by sweeping over classifier score thresholds, and
calculating the precision and recall at each threshold.
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Fig. 4: Binary Classification: Impact of Number of Non-targeted Training/Testing Samples (DuckDuckGo and Google)
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Fig. 5: Multi-level Classification: Impact of Number of Non-targeted Training Samples (DuckDuckGo and Google)
(true positive rate= TPTP+FN ).
32 PRCbc reflects the trade-
off between precision and recall for different decision
thresholds.
• Average Precision (APbc): This summarizes a given
precision-recall curve as the weighted mean of precisions
achieved at each classifier score threshold33—it reflects
how accurate the classifier is, when it labels a testing
sample as targeted.
Impact of Number of Non-targeted Training/Testing Sam-
ples: We plot the APbc achieved by Wfin++ and PSC for
different number of non-targeted training and testing samples
in Fig. 4a and 4b, respectively, and the PRCbc (Wfin++,
DuckDuckGo) for different number of non-targeted testing
samples in Fig. 4c. We observe:
• Search queries using DuckDuckGo, with both higher pre-
cision and higher recall, are consistently more vulnerable
to be fingerprinted than those using Google (similar to
observations in closed-world evaluations).
• Attackers can benefit from training on larger number of
non-targeted training samples (Fig. 4a)—APbc increases
from 90-94% to around 94-98% as the number of non-
targeted training samples increases from 10k to 190k (the
number of non-targeted testing samples used is 50k).
• As the number of non-targeted test samples increases
(testing dataset becomes increasingly imbalanced), APbc
keeps decreasing (Fig. 4b)– for example, APbc drops from
32True positives—TP (true negatives—TN) are number of the targeted
(non-targeted) samples that are correctly classified. False positives—FP (false
negatives—FN) are the number of non-targeted (targeted) samples that are
incorrectly classified.
33AP =
∑
n (Rn −Rn−1) ∗ Pn, where Pn and Rn are precision and
recall at the nth threshold [79].
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Fig. 6: Multi-level Classification: False negative rate with
varying number of non-targeted testing samples (DuckDuckGo
and Google).
100% to around 82% as the number of non-targeted testing
samples increases from 0 to around 190k with Google
(the number of non-targeted training samples used is 50k).
However, the attacker is still able to distinguish 12,960
targeted samples from 190k non-targeted ones with 80%
APbc for Google and 90% APbc for DuckDuckGo.
• Both precision and recall decrease when the number of
non-targeted test samples increases (Fig. 4c).34 For in-
stance, as number of non-targeted test samples increases
from 70k to 190k, a precision of 88% can be maintained
only at the expense of recall decreasing from 90% to 70%.
We conclude that, in practice, it seems feasible for attackers
to determine whether a query is targeted or not, even in the
presence of large scale unseen samples.
34A similar trend is observed with Google using Wfin++ and PSC—results
are omitted due to space constraints.
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B. Multi-level Classification
After determining that a given search query belongs to the
targeted list (binary classification), an attacker can apply an
additional classifier trained with only targeted samples (under
the closed-world assumption), to further identify the specific
targeted keyword. We evaluate this 2-level classification by
feeding the samples that are classified as targeted by the binary
classifier, to a second model that is trained with targeted sam-
ples (with 1,440 labels corresponding to the exact keyword).
The label predicted by each classifier is the one with the
highest mean probability estimate across the trees in the Extra-
Trees classifier. We measure:
• False Positive Rate (FPRml): The fraction of non-targeted
samples that are incorrectly classified, FPFP+TN (binary
classification).
• False Negative Rate (FNRml): The fraction of targeted
samples that are incorrectly classified, FNTP+FN (binary
classification).
• Accuracyml: The fraction of true positives (identified by
the first classifier) that are correctly classified at the second
level.
The first two metrics reflect the performance of the binary
classifier in terms of sifting targeted samples from non-targeted
ones, while the last metric reflects the ability of the second
classifier to differentiate among targeted search queries. Fig.
5 shows the performance achieved in multi-level classification
scenario with different number of non-targeted training sam-
ples using Wfin++ and PSC.35 We observe:
• Training the binary classifier on a larger number of non-
targeted training samples reduces the FPRml, but increases
the FNRml (Fig. 5a and 5b)—with 190k non-targeted
training samples, the FNRml of Wfin++ is around 4%
(out of 12,960) with DuckDuckGo and 11% with Google,
which shows classifiers’ ability to identify targeted testing
samples even in the presence of large number of non-
targeted testing samples. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows how
FNRml changes as the number of non-targeted testing
samples increases—we find that FNRml is not significantly
affected and remains to around 1% for DuckDuckGo and
4% for Googles with 50k non-targeted training samples.36
35Results with different number of non-targeted testing samples are in
Appendix O.
36Note that the attacker has the ability to achieve a different balance between
the FPRml and FNRml of the binary classifier, by tuning classifier thresholds
(similar to Fig. 4c).
• The Accuracyml of the second level classifier is not sig-
nificantly impacted by the number of non-targeted training
samples—it is around 50% for Google and 90% for
DuckDuckGo (consistent with closed-world evaluations).
However, as a larger number of non-targeted training
samples are used, the binary classifier labels more targeted
samples as false negatives—hence, the overall performance
of determining which targeted keyword a user is searching
for, decreases.
• In all performance measures, Wfin++ consistently outper-
forms PSC.
C. Multi-class Classification
The attacker may choose to simply train a single classifier
to determine exactly which targeted query is being searched
for. In this case, samples associated with different targeted
keywords have different labels (as in closed-world scenario),
while all non-targeted samples share the same label (e.g., -1).
To evaluate performance, we define below an additional
metric—the False Monitored Rate (FMRmc). Each targeted
sample is categorized as either a true positive: TPmc (the key-
word is correctly identified), a false negative: FNmc (the sam-
ple is labeled as non-targeted), or a false monitored: FMmc
(the sample is labeled as an incorrect targeted keyword).
FMRmc is computed as the ratio of false monitored to the total
number of targeted samples: FMRmc = FMmcFMmc+TPmc+FNmc .
Fig. 7 plots the FMRmc, FPRmc (fraction of non-
targeted samples that are incorrectly classified), and TPRmc
(= TPmcFMmc+TPmc+FNmc , fraction of targeted samples that are
fingerprinted correctly), for different number of non-targeted
training samples (50k non-targeted testing samples). We find:
• FPRmc is low—even with just 10k non-targeted training
samples, only 4% (of 50k) non-targeted testing samples
are misclassified with DuckDuckGo.
• FMRmc decreases when a larger number of non-targeted
training samples are used—the trend is more obvious with
Google, for which the FMRmc reduces to nearly 0 when
190k non-monitored training samples are used.
• Finally, TPRmc also decreases along with FMRmc, for
larger number of non-targeted training samples—this im-
plies that FNmc must be increasing, and a larger number of
targeted samples get classified as non-targeted (consistent
with Fig. 5b).
Conclusion Based on our multi-level and multi-class evalua-
tions, we reach the following conclusions:
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• Determining which targeted keywords is searched for by
a user, in the presence of large numbers of non-targeted
samples, is challenging but not impossible. For example,
with DuckDuckGo, an attacker is able to correctly classify
more than 80% targeted keywords when training with 10k
non-targeted samples.
• Incorporating more non-targeted samples during training
can help decrease the false positive rate, but also decreases
the true positive rate and increases the false negative rate.
To achieve a different balance between these metrics,
attackers can either adjust the decision threshold in binary
classification or consider “top-k” predictions in multi-class
classification [31], [65], [50];
• Consistent with closed-world evaluations, DuckDuckGo
samples are more vulnerable than Google samples to be
fingerprinted in the presence of non-targeted samples.
• A better performance is achievable when the attacker trains
two classifiers using multi-level classification instead of
one classifier with the “one-step” multi-class classification
scheme, especially with Google samples. For example,
when training with 190k non-targeted samples, an attacker
is able to identify 90% of targeted keywords and correctly
classify them with 50% accuracy in multi-level classifi-
cation. However, the attacker is only able to correctly
classify around 20% of targeted samples with multi-class
classification.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Regular Web page Visit vs. Search Query
One challenge remaining is whether it is possible for
attackers to distinguish search query from regular web page
visit. Although Oh et al.[48] attempted to study the problem in
Tor, the results are not conclusive due to the use of two datasets
collected using different platforms at different times. Due to
the access to per-connection headers and IP addresses, the
problem in HTTPS are much easier. We crawled the web pages
in https://www.yahoo.com on Jan. 17th, 2020 and obtained in
total 73,605 urls served from yahoo – among them, 24,016 are
search query result pages, including 16,175 web search, 3,211
image search, 2,272 video search and 2,353 other searches
(e.g., shopping, recipes, answers, news and finance) while the
remaining 49,589 are regular web page visits severed under ya-
hoo.com (e.g., https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/about-makers-
183936026.html). We visited all 73,605 urls during Jan.17th
and 18th, 2020 with chrome and collected the associated traffic
traces using the same methodology in Section III-C. The SNI
field in TLS header reveals the server name for each TCP
connection and in total we obtain 150 domains under ya-
hoo.com. By counting the number of TCP connections served
from each of the yahoo domain, we create a feature matrix for
training a Extra-Tree classifier to differentiate between web
page visit and search query traffic. In the experiment, we
randomly selected 10,000 web page visit and 10,000 search
query results for training and another 10,000 web page visit
and 10,000 search query results for testing. The experiment is
repeated 50 times and on average the accuracy is 99.29±0.06
%, which indicates attackers’ ability to easily separate web
page visits from search query using server names obtained
from SNI field.
B. Effect of Cache
In this section, we investigated the cache policy of each
of the four search engines from its traffic traces. Below is a
summary of cache policies adopted by search engines:
1) When Google/Bing return the search results, the index.html
is never cached (cache control = private, max-age = 0).
Furthermore, all images in Google and most in Bing that
are displayed on the returned page are encoded in the
index.html, instead of sending GET request to fetch the
object from another server. The only few contents being
cached are general Google elements such as the googlemic
figure, activityindictor gif and favicon.ico.
2) For DuckDuckGo, the max-age for index.html is set to
1 second (smaller than time to type a new keyword).
DuckDuckGo results generally contain less images and are
served from external-content.duckduckgo.com.
3) For Yahoo, index.html is not cached while almost all
images are served from yimg.com and cache is applied. But
attackers can get rid of the caching effect by considering
only TCP connections to yahoo.com – which has been
shown (Section V-D) to improve the accuracy of Yahoo.
VIII. LIMITATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study the vulnerability of keyword finger-
printing in HTTPS traffic with a large-scale dataset of nearly 4
million search samples, and study the impact of several factors.
Our evaluation methodology differs from [48] in the several
ways: (i) we consider keyword fingerprinting in HTTPS traffic
(versus Tor traffic); (ii) we study the impact of several factors
on keyword fingerprinting—including client browser diversity,
web search engine, time, as well as noisy traffic features;
and (iii) our evaluation dataset is larger by several orders of
magnitude. Our key findings include:
• Search engines differ in the vulnerability of their users to
keyword fingerprinting—Bing is the least vulnerable (up to
45%), followed by Google (up to 80%); while Yahoo and
DuckDuckGo (up to 96%) users are the most vulnerable.
• An attacker can achieve high fingerprinting accuracy: (i)
by ignoring traffic going to secondary domains, other than
the search engine contacted by a user; (ii) by training on
data collected using diverse client browser platforms; and
(iii) by re-training their classifiers on data collected every
2-3 days.
• Search query fingerprinting is indeed a potential privacy
concern even in open-world scenarios in which large
scale unseen samples may be encountered—attackers are
able to identify specific targeted search queries with 80%
recall and 85% precision with 10k non-targeted training
samples and 50k non-targeted testing samples from Duck-
DuckGo/Chrome (Section VI).
We find our observations alarming about the possibility of
fingerprinting search keywords being used by current Internet
users. We believe this topic should receive significant and
immediate attention from the research community. Some open
issues that need to be addressed are:
• Countermeasures: Given the dominance of HTTPS in
world-wide Internet traffic, our results urge for the study of
efficient countermeasures against keyword fingerprinting.
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In Appendix P, we study the efficiency of two counter-
measures designed for website fingerprinting with HTTPS
traffic: PadToMTU and HTTPOS [40]. Our preliminary
results suggest that these two countermeasures can help
decrease the classification accuracy, albeit, after incurring
significant bandwidth overhead. Thus, we consider an
extensive study of the design and evaluation of efficient
countermeasures (e.g., [22], [40], [77]) as important future
work.
• Mobile Web Browsers and Voice-based Searches: An in-
creasing number of users are relying on mobile devices,
rather than PCs, to access the Internet. Meanwhile, voice
services such as Amazon Alexa, Google Home, and Apple
Siri has gained a lot of popularity in recent years. As part
of future work, we plan to study the vulnerability of search
query fingerprinting for users with mobile devices.
• Traffic Segmentation: This paper assumes that a user’s
traffic has already been cleanly segmented on a per-search
session basis—such an assumption has been used in nearly
all prior work on website/webpage/keyword fingerprinting,
both in HTTPS and Tor [37], [31], [22], [75], [74], [51],
[30], [57], [81], [48], [3]. In practice, traffic from a user
is likely to contain overlapping connections from multiple
tabs, multiple browsers, as well as traffic from several web
requests multiplexed onto pipelined HTTPS connections—
segmenting such a mix into traffic corresponding to indi-
vidual web requests remains an important open problem
in this field.
• Deep Learning: The application of deep learning for web-
site fingerprinting in Tor has recently been explored in
[1], [57], [66]—this body of work has shown that deep
learning is able to achieve comparable or even better
performance compared to traditional machine learning
classification frameworks, without the need for manual
feature engineering. It is important for deep learning to also
be explored for fingerprinting HTTPS traffic—as future
work, we plan to do so for keyword fingerprinting.
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APPENDIX
A. Related Work: Broader Discussion
Keyword Fingerprinting The possibility of identifying users’
search query has draw attentions from researchers. Chen
et al. points out that sensitive information is being leaked
out from several web applications, including search engines,
despite the protection of HTTPS [15]. They consider the
auto-suggestion/auto-complete features implemented by search
engines as the main reason for query word leakage since for
different combination of letters, list of packet sizes responded
by search engines for each type-in is unique. More specifically,
Sharma et al. demonstrates that for every character typed in
Google search box, the exchanged packet is followed by a
fixed pattern—the request size is increased by one byte for
every character typed in while the response size reveals the
suggestion made by the search engine [64]. In their threat
model, the attacker sends 26 requests for each character (a-
z) and captures the size of suggestion for comparison after
collecting the sequence of packet sizes from networking trace.
Thus to find a string of size n, the attacker needs to send
26n automated search requests. Later, Schaub et al. study
how to use stochastic algorithm to deal with variable packet
lengths considering that Google has supported variable packet
lengths for a given query with payload randomization and Gzip
compression since 2012 [58]. For a given length, they create a
prefix tree to represent the set of all possible words based on
a chosen dictionary and preform hierarchical matching based
on the observed size of responded packets. Oh et al. [48] first
extend standard website fingerprinting attacks to fingerprint
individual keywords that contains more than one word in Tor
and further apply deep learning to the threat model [50].
Website/Webpage Fingerprinting Website fingerprinting
refers to the task of learning which website/webpage is being
visited based on the information available from the TCP/IP
headers in network traffic. Researchers have demonstrated
the possibility to fingerprint websites/webpages in several
communication scenarios including HTTPS (e.g., [45], [73],
[41], [3]), encrypted tunnel (e.g., [37], [31], [52], [39], [22])
and Tor (e.g., [14], [83], [75], [13], [51], [76]). We refer
readers to [81] for a detailed discussion about website/webpage
fingerprinting in each communication scenario.
More recently, Abe et al.[1], Rimmer et al. [57] and
Sirinam et al. [65] explore the application of deep learning to
further boost the classification accuracy of website fingerprint-
ing without manual feature selection. Jansen et al. [33] explore
traffic analysis attacks on Tor with middle relays rather than
with relays from entry or exit positions.
Other Learning-based Traffic Analysis Topics Other than
website/webpage fingerprinting, machine learning has been
applied in other fields of traffic analysis. Specifically, Wright
et al. [80] shows the possibility to identify the phrase spoken
within encrypted VoIP calls using knowledge of the phonetic
pronunciation of words and Hidden Markov Model. Coull
et al. [18] shows that information from instant messaging
services such as users actions, the language of messages and
even the length of the message can be learnt with more than
96% accuracy using only the sizes of encrypted packets. Alan
et al. [4] and Vincent et al. [71] study the possibility of
identifying applications installed on a smartphone using side-
channel data such as packet size and direction. Schuster et
al. [60] and Gu et al. [28] demonstrate the possibility of
fingerprinting streaming videos by modeling their unique burst
patterns using machine learning. Barradas et al. [9] explores
the application of semi-supervised and unsupervised machine
learning techniques to identify multimedia protocol tunneling
systems including Facet, CovertCast and Deltashaper.
B. Distribution and Examples of search queries
Fig. 8 plots the distribution of number of characters in
each search keyword. As can be seen, most of keywords are
composed of multiple characters.
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Fig. 8: Number of Characters in Search Keywords.
TABLE X shows 10 examples of the harvested non-targeted
keywords. The non-targeted keyword list is representative
since: (i) it is composed of more than 200K popular web
search queries, (ii) it contains more than one language, and
(iii) it covers different topics.
TABLE X: 10 Examples of non-targeted search queries.
1 iron man 3 lego 6 gmail windows app
2 $5 pizza hut deals 7 cool things to buy
3 (1− x2)3 8 python
4 澳門教青局 9 스크래치
5 proceso de fecundacio´n 10 comcast specials
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(a) Statistical information for traffic traces generated with different typing speeds with Google/Chrome.
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Fig. 9: Impact of Typing Speeds
C. Impact of Typing speeds
In this section, we study how typing speeds of enter-
ing search queries affect the traffic trace and the keyword
classification accuracy in closed-world scenario. We collect a
monitored dataset with 4 search engines (i.e., Google, Bing,
Yahoo, DuckDuckGo) and 2 browsers (Chrome, Firefox), and
vary the intervals between typing of consecutive characters in
the search query from 0 to 1.2 seconds (representing different
typing speeds). In total, we collect around 315,000 samples
and analyze the following three aspects of the traffic traces
collected using different typing speeds:
1) General statistical information such as the total incom-
ing/outgoing packet number and bytes. Fig. 9a presents
the results with Google/Chrome: the average inter-arrival
time between subsequent incoming/outgoing packets does
increase as typing speed decreases. However, there is no
obvious variations in terms of packet number and bytes.
The same trend is observed across other search engines
and browsers.
2) Linear discriminant analysis to understand how separable
are traces collected with different typing speeds in their
feature space. We consider around 6,000 samples for
each typing speed and use packet size count as features
considering its good performance in prior experiments.
Fig. 10 shows the result when projecting each feature
space onto the three-dimensional subspace. As can be seen,
samples collected with different typing speeds are densely
clustered together and can not be easily differentiated from
each other, which indicates the similarity in their feature
spaces.
3) Evaluating the vulnerability of traces collected with dif-
ferent typing speeds in face of keyword fingerprinting. We
measure the classification accuracy with cross-validation
using PSC. Fig. 9b shows the results obtained with 140
targeted keywords, each with 18 samples, for Google and
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Fig. 10: Linear discriminant analysis for traces with different
typing speeds using PSC.
DuckDuckGo traces collected with different typing speeds.
As can be seen, the accuracy does not consistently increase
or decrease as the typing speed varies.
Based on the above investigations, we did not observe any
obvious evidence to indicate that a users’ typing speed impacts
their vulnerability of being fingerprinted.
D. Wfin++: Forward Feature Selection
The Wfin methodology for feature selection ranks features
based on their importance for classification, and then groups
the features that account for 99% importance into semantically-
relevant feature categories—all of these feature categories are
then used to perform website fingerprinting [81].
We believe that the above methodology does not consider
the significant amount of noise that can be retained when a
large number of features are used by a classifier—we believe
that a better classification performance can be achieved by re-
ducing features further in a manner similar to forward selection
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[29], [19], [33]. In Wfin++, we consider the final ranked list of
feature categories returned by Wfin, and compute the validation
accuracy by considering only the top-N feature categories. The
goal is to find the N that yields the best validation accuracy.
Fig. 11 plots the validation accuracy versus N, when the top-
N feature categories are used for keyword classification with
the four search engines accessed using the Chrome browser
(Extra-Trees classifier, number of trees: 700). A similar trend
is observed with all search engines—after the initial increase
in classification accuracy, adding more features causes the
accuracy to drop.
Thus the final feature list in Wfin++ is selected as the
one that achieves the highest validation accuracy—just like
Wfin, this feature list differs across the search engines. For
instance, the final number of features selected for training with
Yahoo/Chrome is around 5,820, while with Google/Chrome is
around 7,200.
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Fig. 11: Validation Accuracy: top-N features used for classifi-
cation (Chrome, homepage searching mode)
E. HTTPS vs. Tor
Tor traffic has attracted lots of attentions for traffic analysis
in website/keyword fingerprinting [50], [75], [34], [74], [30],
[51], [77], [48], [36], [65]. Hence we compare the performance
of Tor and HTTPS traffic in face of keyword fingerprinting to
understand: (i) How vulnerable HTTPS traffic is compared with
Tor? (ii) Can classifiers designed for Tor be directly applied
onto HTTPS traffic?
To minimize the impact of irrelevant variations (e.g., data
collection platform, visiting time and targeted keywords etc.)
on classification accuracy, we collect another dataset with 2
search engines (Google and DuckDuckGo) and 2 browsers
(Chrome and Tor (version 8.5.5)) in a round-robin way using
the same 100 targeted keywords as Oh et al. [49]. Each
keyword contains at least 100 samples, with the first 100
samples used for training/validation and the last 10 for testing.
TABLE XI shows the testing accuracy with the PSC, k-FP and
EtResp/SvmResp. Besides, we train with SvmResp using the
code provided by Oh et al. [49] to compare the performance
of Extra-Trees and SVM. We find that:
TABLE XI: Classification accuracy with 100 targeted key-
words under Chrome vs. Tor.
DuckDuckGo Google
Tor Chrome Tor Chrome
PSC 11.43 ± 0.65 100.00 4.60 ± 0.56 95.75 ± 0.21
k-FP 42.65 ± 0.57 98.56 ± 0.04 23.66 ± 0.33 89.74 ± 0.25
EtResp 37.01 ± 0.39 97.25 ± 0.12 14.27 ± 0.21 41.96 ± 0.30
SvmResp 31.10 93.54 13.00 25.10
• With the same set of features, Extra-Trees achieves compa-
rable and slightly better performance compared with SVM.
Besides, the same trend is also observed when we re-
run SvmResp and EtResp with the closed-world dataset
provided by Oh et al. [49]. For 100 Google keywords,
the precision achieved by EtResp is 100% and 82% by
SvmResp, when for each keyword 80 samples are for
training and 30 for testing.
• HTTPS traffic are indeed more vulnerable than Tor traffic,
which makes keyword fingerprinting under HTTPS a more
severe concern considering its vulnerability and the scale
of potential victims. However, classifiers that achieve high
performance in one communication scenario do not always
obtain an equal high performance in other strict/relaxed
communication scenarios [81]. For example, PSC achieves
up to 95% accuracy under HPPTS but only around 4% to
11% in Tor. The same trend is also observed with k-FP
and EtResp/SvmResp.
F. Vulnerability of Search Engines with Edge
TABLE XII shows the classification accuracy achieved
using four different search engines with the Edge browser. The
targeted dataset is split into three disjoint subsets for training,
validation, and testing, with the ratio of 8:1:1: for every 10
consecutive visits of a search query, the first 8 samples are used
for training, the 9th for validation, and the 10th for testing.
For each targeted keyword, we consider 32 training samples,
4 validation samples and 4 testing samples during evaluation.
To obtain the test accuracy shown in TABLE XII, we use 36
samples for training (including both samples from training and
validation dataset) and 4 for testing. We observe that:
• Wfin++ and PSC consistently achieve better accuracy than
EtResp and k-FP.
• Among all four search engines, DuckDuckGo makes the
user the most vulnerable to keyword fingerprinting, while
Bing offers the least vulnerability in homepage searching
mode.
• After filtering out homepage traffic in address searching
mode, classification accuracy of Yahoo increased by about
10%—which makes Yahoo traffic the most vulnerable. The
classification accuracy of DuckDuckGo and Bing did not
increase much, while that of Google decreased by about
4%.
G. Informative Features Selected by Wfin++
TABLE XIII lists the top 20 informative feature categories
selected by Wfin++ with DuckDuckGo (Chrome) in address-
bar searching mode.
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TABLE XII: Classification Accuracy Achieved: Edge.
Homepage Searching Mode
Edge Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 35.10 ± 0.12 77.52 ± 0.15 64.09 ± 0.25 78.75 ± 0.08
PSC 28.81 ± 0.36 72.22 ± 0.13 59.31 ± 0.32 76.15 ± 0.19
EtResp 5.57 ± 0.10 0.49 ± 0.03 10.60 ± 0.09 8.17 ± 0.08
k-FP 9.53 ± 0.07 1.11 ± 0.07 13.85 ± 0.14 11.56 ± 0.11
Addressbar Searching Mode
Edge Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 35.27 ± 0.22 87.96 ± 0.09 59.54 ± 0.28 78.82 ± 0.18
PSC 30.02 ± 0.17 84.90 ± 0.11 60.34 ± 0.06 76.30 ± 0.1
EtResp 5.71 ± 0.02 0.98 ± 0.01 11.60 ± 0.09 10.53 ± 0.12
k-FP 8.67 ± 0.07 2.31 ± 0.07 15.64 ± 0.19 13.19 ± 0.23
TABLE XIII: Top 20 informative feature categories with Wfin
(DuckDuckGo)
0 unique packet size 24.397
1 initial 30 outgoing packets 10.767
2 packet size count 6.336
3 first 300 incoming packets preposition 3.824
4 first 300 outgoing packets position 3.703
5 first 300 outgoing packets preposition 3.362
6 first 300 incoming packets position 2.971
7 initial outgoing bursts 2.864
8 average outgoing inter-arrival time 2.742
9 initial 30 packets 2.338
10 initial 30 incoming packets 2.248
11 unique burst size 1.993
12 first 20 largest outgoing bytes per TCP conn. 1.827
13 initial incoming bursts 1.708
14 ratio of incoming bytes per TCP conn. 1.566
15 initial 30 outgoing in first TCP conn. 1.379
16 burst size count 1.279
17 first 20 largest outgoing bytes per hostname 1.264
18 outgoing bytes per TCP conn. 1.071
19 outgoing bytes per TCP conn. w.r.t. Port 443/80 0.974
H. Parameter tuning in Extra-Trees classifier
We use the implementation of Extra-Trees classifier from
sklearn [67] in python3 [54] and tune two parameters (criterion
and n estimators) based on the validation accuracy achieved
with the monitored dataset. For other parameters, we use the
default value in sklearn.
1) Gini Index vs. Information Gain: The selection of
features at each node of the tree to split the data (split
criterion) directly affects the performance with decision tree-
based ensemble methods. Two widely used split criterion is
Gini Index and Information Gain. A lot of research was
dedicated to understand which of them produce the best
decision tree for a given dataset [46], [38], [70], [55]. Although
most of empirical studies concluded that there is no significant
differences between those two criteria and the disagreement
is generally no higher than 2% of all cases, we show the
validation accuracy achieved with different feature sets when
using different criteria with Extra-Trees classifier (n estimators
= 700) in Fig. 12 for Google/Chrome (the overall trend is
consistent across different search engines and browsers).
Based on the outcome in Fig. 12, Gini Index achieves better
accuracy compared with Information Gain with the monitored
dataset and the gap ranges from around 2% to 21% across
different feature sets with Google/Chrome. Thus we choose
Gini Index as the split criterion in Extra-Trees classifier.
2) Number of Trees: As Breiman stated in [11], the be-
havior of prediction error for randomization methods is a
monotonically decreasing function of number of trees in the
ensemble. Thus the more the trees, the better the accuracy and
the higher the computational overhead. In Fig. 13, we show the
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Fig. 12: Classification Accuracy: Different Split Criteria
average error rate obtained by Wfin++ and the classification
time when ranging the number of trees from 100 to 1,000 with
Google/Chrome. As the results suggested, the error rate tends
to stabilize and the classification time increase significantly
as we keep increasing the number of trees – the error rate
decrease around 0.1% while the classification time is increased
by nearly 2/3 from 700 to 800. The same trend is observed with
different search engines and browsers. In both closed-world
and open-world experiments, therefore, we set the number of
trees to 700.
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Fig. 13: Error Rate and Classification Time (Wfin++,
Google/Chrome): impact of number of trees in Extra-Trees
I. Impact of Number of Targeted Keywords
In this section, we study how the accuracy changes as
more targeted keywords are considered for classification by
varying the number of keywords from 100 to 1400. For each
keyword, 45 samples are used for training and 9 for testing as
in Section V-A. Fig. 14 shows the accuracy with four search
engines using Wfin++ and PSC with Chrome in addressbar
searching mode. As the results indicate, the performance
keeps decreasing as more targeted keywords are considered
although the rate of decline differs among search engines. For
example, when number of targeted keywords is increased from
100 to 1,440, the accuracy drops significantly from around
67% to 45% with Bing/Chrome, but slightly from 99% to
96% with DuckDuckGo/Chrome.37 Thus when the number
of targeted keyword keeps growing, more advanced machine
learning techniques such as deep learning may help boost the
performance [50].
J. Addressbar Searching Mode: Generated Traffic Pattern
Fig. 15 displays the traffic pattern generated by four
different search engines for the same search query in Fig. 2 in
37A consistent trend is also observed with Firefox samples but the results
are omitted due to space constraints.
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Fig. 14: Classification accuracy achieved by Wfin++ and PSC
with different number of targeted keywords (Chrome browser).
addressbar searching mode. TABLE XIV shows the second-
level server name contained in the traffic trace in Fig. 15 with
Yahoo (Chrome).
TABLE XIV: Second-level Sever Names: Yahoo with Chrome
in addressbar searching mode
2019-02-25-16-48-03 2019-02-25-17-39-38
yahoo.com 4 yahoo.com 5
yimg.com 1 yimg.com 1
bing.com 1 addthis.com 1
google.com 1
bing.com 1
2019-02-25-18-30-39 2019-02-25-19-20-47
yahoo.com 5 bing.net 6
yahoodns.net 5 yahoo.com 5
yimg.com 1 krxd.net 1
nexac.com 1
addthis.com 1
google.com 1
bing.com 1
K. Safari and Chrome in homepage searching mode
TABLE XV shows the performance of Wfin++ and PSC
in cross-browser scenario with Google and Firefox samples.
Similar trend is observed as in addressbar searching mode–
the accuracy degrades drastically when the training and testing
browser do not match.
TABLE XV: Classification Accuracy: Cross-browser Attacks
in Homepage Searching
DDG Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 91.95 ± 0.10 92.23 ± 0.02 1.22 ± 0.09 1.82 ± 0.05
Chrome 0.22 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.05 96.15 ± 0.01 96.33 ± 0.04
Fire/Chr 91.40 ± 0.08 92.14 ± 0.06 96.30 ± 0.04 96.04 ± 0.04
Google Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 75.56 ± 0.07 76.75 ± 0.02 0.38 ± 0.07 1.42 ± 0.04
Chrome 0.07 0.98 ± 0.13 60.32 ± 0.07 57.72 ± 0.05
Fire/Chr 75.17 ± 0.13 75.88 ± 0.13 61.91 ± 0.31 57.12 ± 0.14
Yahoo Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 58.06 ± 0.25 49.87 ± 0.13 15.61 ± 0.35 12.42 ± 0.21
Chrome 4.01 ± 0.39 2.47 ± 0.04 64.60 ± 0.21 57.85 ± 0.26
Fire/Chr 57.56 ± 0.12 48.73 ± 0.18 64.22 ± 0.22 56.23 ± 0.05
L. Time Effect in homepage searching mode
TABLE XVI summarizes the impact of time gap between
training and test samples, in closed-world evaluations with the
homepage searching mode (Chrome browser).
TABLE XVI: Impact of Time (Chrome, homepage searching
mode)
DDG test-3 test-4 test-8 test-10 test-14
Wfin++ 92.20 90.56 81.22 71.79 71.70
PSC 92.47 90.84 80.2 69.74 69.39
EtResp 26.65 22.04 11.92 7.61 6.58
k-FP 28.82 27.07 20.98 14.62 14.00
Google test-3 test-4 test-8 test-10 test-14
Wfin++ 54.29 44.54 23.44 18.92 18.16
PSC 47.33 35.39 9.92 9.83 14.69
EtResp 24.78 22.05 14.06 6.89 6.29
k-FP 18.96 19.76 15.26 12.35 10.38
M. Cross-browser attack with Edge and Safari
TABLE XVII shows the accuracy achieved when using 36
Edge samples for training and 4 Firefox samples for testing
in both homepage searching mode and addressbar searching
mode. Consistent with the results obtained in Section V-C, the
classification accuracy degrades severely when using samples
from different browser/device for training and testing. For
instance, when testing with Safari samples the accuracy is
dropped to less than 0.2% compared with around 78% with
Edge samples.
TABLE XVII: Classification accuracy (%) in cross-browser
attack with Edge and Safari. (DDG: DuckDuckGo)
Homepage Searching Mode
DDG Edge SafariWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Edge 78.75 ± 0.08 76.15 ± 0.19 0.19 ± 0.04 0.15 ± 0.02
Google Edge SafariWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Edge 64.09 ± 0.25 59.31 ± 0.32 0.09 ± 0.02 0.07
Addressbar Searching Mode
DDG Edge SafariWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Edge 78.82 ± 0.18 76.30 ± 0.1 0.19 ± 0.05 0.12 ± 0.02
Google Edge SafariWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Edge 59.54 ± 0.28 60.33 ± 0.07 0.46 ± 0.06 0.07
N. Eliminating Noise from “Other” Domains
TABLE XVIII summarizes the classification accuracy
when connections to only top-level domains are considered
by the attacker.
TABLE XVIII: Classification Accuracy when only considering
top domains in addressbar searching mode.
DDG Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 93.50 ± 0.06 93.42 ± 0.06 1.00 ± 0.14 0.96 ± 0.09
Chrome 1.79 ± 0.20 1.99 ± 0.14 96.63 ± 0.03 96.62 ± 0.04
Google Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 78.20 ± 0.10 80.53 ± 0.16 2.21 ± 0.06 1.80 ± 0.05
Chrome 5.13 ± 0.11 1.30 ± 0.17 62.39 ± 0.10 59.16 ± 0.08
Bing Firefox ChromeWfin++ PSC Wfin++ PSC
Firefox 46.37 ± 0.13 46.23 ± 0.20 2.94 ± 0.16 3.04 ± 0.21
Chrome 6.77 ± 0.14 2.72 ± 0.24 45.87 ± 0.14 45.77 ± 0.16
O. Multi-level Classification: Impact of Number of Non-
targeted Test Samples
Fig. 16 shows the performance of Wfin++ and PSC in
multi-level classification, for different number of non-targeted
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Fig. 15: Traffic generated using Chrome: Addressbar Searching (caption below each sub-figure indicates time of search)
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Fig. 16: Multi-level Classification: Impact of Number of Non-targeted Test Samples (50k Non-targeted Training Samples)
testing samples. We observe that:
• More non-targeted samples are incorrectly classified as
targeted ones (FPR), as the number of non-targeted testing
samples increases.
• The likelihood of incorrectly classifying a targeted sample
(FNR) is not affected by the number of non-targeted testing
samples.
P. Countermeasures
In this section, we evaluate keyword fingerprinting in the
presence of countermeasures in closed-world scenarios. By
examining the most-informative features yielded by Wfin++,38
38Top 30 informative features categories selected by Wfin++ in addressbar
searching mode with DuckDuckGo (Chrome) are listed in Appendix G.
we find that most of these are extracted from packet sizes
(e.g., unique packet size and packet size count) and packet
ordering (e.g., initial 30 outgoing packets and first 300
incoming/outgoing packets preposition). We next consider
two prominent HTTPS countermeasures that obfuscate ac-
tual packet size or packet ordering—PadToMTU [22] and
HTTPOS [40].39 PadToMTU aims at hiding actual packet
sizes, which is one of the most informative features for website
fingerprinting in HTTPS [37], [31], [51], [22], [81], [3], by
padding each packet to MTU bytes. HTTPOS is a browser-
side defense to obfuscate traffic by exploiting several TCP
and HTTP features—including, MSS negotiation, advertised
window, HTTP Range, and HTTP Pipelining [40]. Specifically,
39Advanced countermeasures designed for encrypted tunnels or Tor (e.g.,
[13], [77]) are not considered since they are not directly applicable in HTTPS.
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it injects dummy requests within the user traffic in order
to obfuscate actual traffic patterns, and modifies advertised
window size to make servers pack responses into blocks of
MSS-byte packets (and hide actual packet size). Luo et al. [40]
shows that HTTPOS is able to effectively prevent attackers
from inferring information from 1,000 Google search queries
over HTTPS.
In order to implement PadToMTU, we replace the sizes
of all incoming and outgoing packets in our traces with
MTU bytes. In order to implement HTTPOS, we pad the
packet size of each outgoing packet (request) (p size) to a
value chosen randomly from the discrete uniform distribution
[p size, MTU]; for each incoming packet (response), we
pad the packet size to a value chosen randomly from the
discrete uniform distribution [p size, 3*MSS], and segment
into multiple packets with MSS bytes in each. Specifically, we
set MTU to 1,500 and MSS to 1,000, as described in [40].40
TABLE XIX: Classification Accuracy Against Countermea-
sures: Addressbar Searching
PadToMTU
Chrome Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 9.26 ± 0.17 2.34 ± 0.06 27.95 ± 0.05 44.22 ± 0.01
PSC 0.90 ± 0.03 0.11 ± 0.02 1.45 ± 0.06 3.18 ± 0.04
BW overhead 209.6% 292.6% 193.9% 199.4%
Firefox Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 7.86 ± 0.03 4.54 ± 0.01 27.72 ± 0.07 40.72 ± 0.04
PSC 0.85 ± 0.01 0.11 ± 0.03 1.78 ± 0.05 2.43 ± 0.05
BW overhead 220.2% 330.1% 207.4% 218.7%
HTTPOS
Chrome Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 7.42 ± 0.12 2.11 ± 0.08 25.53 ± 0.02 36.23 ± 0.05
PSC 0.29 ± 0.07 0.11 ± 0.00 0.25 ± 0.01 0.32 ± 0.02
BW overhead 403.3% 514.5% 387.5% 387.4%
Firefox Bing Yahoo Google DuckDuckGo
Wfin++ 6.54 ± 0.02 4.05 ± 0.06 24.23 ± 0.07 33.96 ± 0.13
PSC 0.26 ± 0.00 0.08 ± 0.03 0.28 ± 0.02 0.26 ± 0.04
BW overhead 420.5% 562.9% 405.1% 414.3%
TABLE XIX shows the accuracy of Wfin++ and PSC in the
presence of PadToMTU and HTTPOS for fingerprinting 1,440
targeted keywords—when only connections to top domains
are used (Section V-D) in addressbar searching mode. The
training, validation, and testing dataset are the same as in
Section V-A—for each query, 36 samples are used for training,
9 for validation, and 9 for testing. The accuracies of PSC and
Wfin++ are significantly lower in the presence of PadToMTU
and HTTPOS (compared to Tables VIII and XVIII)—for
instance, for samples collected with DuckDuckGo/Chrome, the
accuracy achieved by Wfin++ decreases from around 96% to
44% or 36%, while the accuracy achieved by PSC decreases
from 96% to 3% or 0.3%, respectively, in the presence of
PadToMTU and HTTPOS.
However, both PadToMTU and HTTPOS incur significant
bandwidth overhead—for instance, with Google/Chrome the
overhead is as high as 193% for PadToMTU, and 387%
for HTTPOS. The PadToMTU overhead is due to padding
each packet to MTU bytes; the HTTPOS overhead is due to
insertion of dummy requests/responses. We leave the design
and evaluation of additional countermeasures against keyword
fingerprinting as important future work.
40The integration of HTTPOS into different browsers to perform automated
large scale data collection with Selenium is considered as a future work.
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